Recently, Gelfond and Lifschitz presented a formal language for representing incomplete knowledge on actions and states, and a sound translation from this language to extended logic programming. We present an alternative translation to abductive logic programming with integrity constraints and prove the soundness and completeness. In addition, we show how an abductive procedure can be used, not only for explanation, but also for deduction and proving satis ability under uncertainty.
Introduction
The key issue in this paper is the representation of incomplete knowledge in a logic programming formalism. In pure Prolog, incomplete knowledge cannot be represented: due to negation as failure, an atom which cannot be proved is assumed to be false. Recently, 17] used extended programs to represent incomplete knowledge in the context of temporal domains. They introduced a new temporal language A which allows to represent a number of well-known benchmark problems involving incomplete temporal knowledge and they proposed a sound transformation to extended programs, programs with both negation as failure and classical or explicit negation 16] .
In the past, another approach has been explored for temporal reasoning, based on event calculus 13], 30], 25], 10]. 10] proposes solutions for the same benchmarks as in 17] . This approach makes use of the formalism of abductive logic programming. One may interpret an abductive program as an open logic program in the sense that it contains only de nitions for the non-abducible predicates. The completion semantics for abductive logic programs of 3] re ects this well by taking as the completion of an abductive program the set of completed de nitions of the non-abducible predicates only. As a consequence, the completion does not impose any restriction on the interpretation of the abducible predicates and incomplete knowledge can be represented via the unde ned predicates. Observe that this treatment Accepted for publication in the Journal of Logic and Computation y supported by a postdoctoral mandate from the research fund of the K.U.Leuven z supported by the Belgian National Fund for Scienti c Research di ers totally from the treatment of a de ned predicate with empty de nition: this latter predicate is always false.
In general an abductive program will allow too much uncertainty. In most applications, the knowledge engineer has knowledge that implicitly restricts the possible states of the unde ned abductive predicates. A declarative way of representing this knowledge is by First-order Logic integrity constraints. In order to illustrate this approach, we present a transformation from A domain descriptions to open programs with First-order Logic integrity constraints (section 3). Despite the fact that the benchmarks in 10] were solved with abductive event calculus, it turns out to be di cult to transform A domain descriptions to event calculus programs: as situation calculus, A is based on the branching time philosophy, whereas event calculus is based on a linear time philosophy. However, the use of the open programs is in no way restricted to event calculus. The proposed transformation maps an A domain description to an open situation calculus.
A second high level goal is to illustrate how an abductive procedure can be useful for automated reasoning with abductive programs and integrity constraints. That an abductive procedure can be used for explanation of some observation is well-known from 28], 30] . It is less known that an abductive procedure can also be used deduction and for proving consistency of a theory. In section 4, we illustrate how an abductive procedure can be used to prove the consistency of an abductive logic program with rst order logic integrity constraints and that an abductive procedure can be used for deduction in an abductive logic program.
In the rest of the paper we will mostly refer to abductive programs as open programs, and to abducible predicates as unde ned predicates. We prefer these names over the commonly used terminology because they re ect the declarative meaning of the concepts: an unde ned predicate has no de nition; an open program is open in the sense that it describes the de ned predicates in terms of a set of unde ned predicates whose interpretation is completely left open. The terminology abductive program and abducible predicate is somewhat misleading, especially in the context of this paper, whose goal it is to show explicitly how to perform other forms of reasoning than abduction on the abductive programs.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we recall the language A and its semantics. In section 3, the transformation from A to situation calculus programs is presented and the soundness and completeness are proved. In section 4, the use of abduction for explanation and deduction is illustrated. Section 5 gives a comparison between our transformation and the transformation in 17]. Section 6 compares our work with another recent transformation from A proposed in 11] . In section 7, we discuss other related work. A short paper on this subject has been published as 8].
2 The temporal language A The language A 17] allows to describe relationships between uents (= time dependent properties of the world) and actions. A is a propositional language: both uents and actions are represented by propositional symbols. Two types of expressions occur. A v-proposition describes the value of a uent after a (possibly empty) sequence of actions. Its syntax is as follows:
f after a 1 ; : : : ; a n Here a 1 ; : : :; a n is a sequence of action symbols and f is a uent expression: a positive or negative literal containing a uent. The expression means that f is true after executing the sequence of actions a 1 ; : : :; a n . When the sequence of actions is empty (n=0), the vproposition describes the initial situation. Instead of f after , one usually writes:
Initially f An e-proposition describes the e ect of actions on the uents. Otherwise, f holds in (a; ) i f holds in .
A domain description is called consistent if it has a model. We introduce a new notion, e-consistency. A domain description is e-consistent if the set of e-propositions of D is consistent. There is a simple necessary and su cient condition for a domain description to be e-consistent. there exists an e-proposition a causes f if p 1 ; : : :; p n such that p 1 ; : : :; p n hold in .
The proof is straightforward.
Note that if the condition of e-consistency is not satis ed, then the description of in the proposition does not correspond to the description of in de nition 2. Note that comp a (P) contains only equivalences with de ned predicates at the left. Intuitively, such an equivalence de nes when the predicate at the left is true in terms of the situations described at the right. Since unde ned predicates have no such de ning equiva-lence, the logic program leaves their interpretation open to a great extend 1 . In general, an abductive logic program allows to much freedom to the interpretation of unde ned predicates. Most often, the program P must be augmented with a set T of First-order Logic (FOL) axioms representing other information which restricts the state of the unde ned predicates.
The declarative semantics of a couple (P; T ) is given by the FOL theory comp a (P)+T . This de nes indirectly a model semantics for (P; T ): in the sequel, when we talk about a model of (P; T ) we mean a classical model of comp a (P) + T .
That the resulting formalism is adequate for representing incomplete information is now obvious: for P = fg, the theory comp a (P) + T collapses to FEQ + T , i.e. classical logic with unique names axioms. The expressivity of this formalism for representing incomplete information is widely accepted.
Our transformation from A to the above formalism produces programs in situation calculus style. Traditionally, two options are available to represent a uent f in a logic formalism:
by a predicate f(s) or by Holds(f; s) where s is a state argument. Then :f is translated to :f(s) or :Holds(f;s). The two approaches are equivalent but the meta-approach has the advantage that the frame axiom can be stated for all uents at once, whereas in the rst approach one frame axiom per uent predicate is needed. :Holds(p 0 1 ; S); : : :; :Holds(p 0 n ; S)
1 As so often with completion semantics, examples can be formulated which contradict this intuition. For example, the 2-valued completion of the program: p :-:p; :a with unde ned predicate a entails that a is true. The problem is caused by the loop over negation of p. For programs which do not contain such loops, it can be shown that the abductive predicates can have any interpretation. In other semantics such as the 3-valued completion semantics for abductive programs 4], the justi cation semantics for abductive programs 7] and the generalised well-founded semantics for abductive logic programs 27], even for programs with loops over negation, the interpretation of the unde ned predicates can be any. Despite these problems with 2-valued completion semantics, we use it here because of its declarative simplicity and its close relationship with First-order Logic.
As in 17], we introduce the convention that when f is a negative literal :f 0 , Holds(f; t) is used as a textual denotation for :Holds(f 0 ; t). This handsome convention allows us to say that a causes f if p 1 ; : : :; p n is translated to the clause: Holds(f; Result(a; S)) :-Holds(p 1 ; S); : : :; Holds(p n ; S) without considering the sign of the literals p i . Be aware that a program should never contain literals of the form Holds(:f; S), and that when these literals are found in this chapterand the following sections, they always stand for :Holds(f;S).
For each e-proposition a causes f if p 1 ; : : : ; p n with f a positive or negative uent literal:
Noninertial(jfj; a; S) :-Holds(p 1 ; S); : : :; Holds(p n ; S) (4) For a uent symbol f, jfj and j:fj both denote the term f.
The set of FOL axioms IC D is de ned as follows:
For each v-proposition f after a 1 ; : : :; a n (n 0):
Holds(f; Result a 1 ; : : :; a n ; s 0 ]) (5) with the same syntactic convention on Holds=2 as above.
Example E i = A = a^F = jfj^Holds(p 1 ; S)^: : :^Holds(p n ; S) such that precisely for each e-proposition a causes f if p 1 ; : : :; p n (f positive or negative), there exists one corresponding disjunct in the completed de nition. This formula is the counterpart of de nition 2.2: the formulation is almost identical apart from the fact that Holds(p i ; S) should be replaced by "p i holds in S".
A transformation such as can be considered correct if the set of entailed formulas are equivalent. Clearly for any v-proposition Q using original symbols of D, it holds that Q holds in ( ; 0 ) i M j = Q. A direct consequence is that M is a model of IC D . It remains to prove that M is a model of comp a (P D ). Before continuing with this proof, we want to stress that the complexity of the construction above is in no way an indication that the proposed transformation is on itself unnecessarily complex or lacks elegance. The proof is by induction on n. For n = 0, this is trivial. So assume that the theorem holds for n ? 1, n > 0. We have the following identity:
M a 1 ;:::;an a = (a n ; M a 1 ;:::;a n?1 a ) = (a n ; state M (M(Result a 1 ; : : : ; a n?1 ; s 0 ])))
The second identity follows from the induction hypothesis. Let x be the domain element M(Result a 1 ; : : :; a n?1 ; s 0 ]). It su ces to show that: (a n ; state M (M(Result a 1 ; : : :; a n?1 ; s 0 ]))) = state M ((M(Result a 1 ; : : :; a n ; s 0 ])) or equivalently: (a n ; state M (x)) = state M (M(Result(a n ; x)))
By proposition 2.1, we nd that f 2 (a n ; state M (x)) i f holds in state M (x) and f is inertial under a n in state M (x), or there exists an e-proposition a n causes f if p 1 ; : : : ; p m such that the uents p 1 ,
The second disjunct corresponds to the fact that M j = Holds(p 1 ; x)^: : :^Holds(p m ; x) for some e-proposition a n causes f if p 1 ; : : :; p m . Because M is a model of the completed de nition of Holds=2, we obtain that f 2 (a n ; state M (x)) i M j = Holds(f; Result(a n ; x)) or equivalently f 2 state M (M (Result(a n ; x) Initiates(a;f; S) :-Holds(p 1 ; S); : : :; Holds(p n ; S)
For each e-proposition a causes :f if p 1 ; : : :; p n with f a positive literal, we add the rule:
Terminates(a; f;S) :-Holds(p 1 ; S); : : :; Holds(p n ; S) In Initially(on) Holds(on; switch n ) for each even n Holds(off; switch n ) for each odd n Noninertial(on; switch; switch n ) for each n Noninertial(off; switch; switch n ) for each n Initiates(switch; on; switch n ) for each odd n Terminates(switch; on; switch n ) for each even n Initiates(switch; off; switch n ) for each even n Terminates(switch; off; switch n ) for each odd n For this example, the semantics of D 3 and D 3 di er. Which semantics is to be preferred? This is a matter of taste, but intuitively we nd the domain description D 3 a sensible theory, and the model a sensible model of the theory. By considering D 3 inconsistent, the semantics of A is to our taste too severe 3 The transformation is correct in the sense that P + IC is equivalent with P 0 + f:falseg according to completion semantics. The remaining integrity constraint :false can be added as an extra literal to the query to be solved by the abductive solver. This result shows that FOL (with FEQ) and incomplete logic programming have the same expressivity in the strongest possible sense, namely on the level of logical equivalence. The proof of this result is a trivial extension of the proof in 23].
For a domain description D, the transformation of the integrity constraints of D to an incomplete program is trivial. A ground atom Holds(F; Result A 1 ; : : :; A n ; S 0 ]) is transformed to: false Each v-proposition f after a 1 ; : : :; a n , is transformed into:
Holds(f; Result a 1 ; : : :; a n ; s 0 ]) (5 0 )
Recall that Holds(:f; : : :) denotes :Holds(f;:::). Each e-proposition a causes f if p 1 ; : : :; p n is translated into 2n+2 rules. Below, Holds(f; S) denotes the complement of Holds(f; S) with respect to :.
Holds(f; Result(a; S)) Holds(p 1 ; S); : : :; Holds(p n ; S) (6 0 ) Noninertial(jfj; a; S) not Holds(p 1 ; S); : : : ; not Holds(p n ; S) ( A striking fact is that GL D contains four inertia rules instead of one in D. (1 0 ) and (2 0 ) are forward persistence rules for respectively positive and negative uents. (3 0 ) and (4 0 ) are backward persistence rules for again positive and negative uents. Clearly (2 0 ), (3 0 ) and (4 0 ) are natural rules, which are expected to hold in any correct formalisation. Therefore, they must be subsumed by D, otherwise could never be sound and complete. As a matter of fact, it is straightforward to prove that for each of the extended rules in GL D, the corresponding clause is subsumed by comp a (P D ), where P D is the logic program part of D. For example, notice that from the classical logic point of view the rules (1 0 ) and (4 0 ) are equivalent and so are the rules (2 0 ) and (3 0 ). This immediately gives that comp a (P D ) subsumes (4 0 ). Clauses corresponding to (2 0 Holds(owner(Y; Obj); S) :Holds(thief(X);S); Holds(thief(X); Result(Pick(X; Obj); S)) X 6 = Y :Holds(thief(X);S);
Holds(thief(X); Result(Pick(X; Obj); S)) These rules say that when X becomes thief by picking something in situation S, then each Y is owner at situation S and no Y is equal to X. This is a contradiction. The problem is that Y should not be universally but existentially quanti ed. The translation to open programs is superior to the translation GL to extended programs. GL creates a higher number of rules, is incomplete, su ers from problems with similar e-propositions and is not directly extendible to the predicate case. The open program approach seems more understandable because only one negation occurs, is sound even with similar e-propositions, is complete for all reasonable domain descriptions and applies without modi cation for the predicate case. Proofs are easy compared with the proofs in 17].
Dungs such that precisely for each e-proposition a causes f if p 1 ; : : :; p n (f positive or negative), there exists one disjunct E i (i > 1) in the completed de nition. This formula says nothing about Holds(F; s 0 ), and therefore, we get a similar semantics as in our approach, but without Initially=1.
Dung extends A to the predicate case and gives an application for integrity checking of a database update. For this purposes, a predicate domain description D is developed to represent the e ects of primitive and compound update operations. An unfolding partial evaluation procedure with constructive negation can then be applied on Du (D) to check the consistency of one or more integrity constraints in the database after the update. The use of a similar unfolding procedure has been proposed earlier in the context of abductive logic programming by 3]. As Dung here, Console et al. use a general unfolding procedure to reduce a given query by unfolding all de ned literals until a rst order logic formula is obtained, containing only abductive literals. The resulting formula is equivalent with the original query and the equivalence with in the left the query and in the right the computed formula is called the explanation formula. Though such a procedure can be used to solve abductive problems, it is much weaker than an abductive procedure like SLDNFA because naive unfolding cannot guarantee the consistency of the righ hand of the explanation formula. In 5, 9], we show that SLDNFA can be interpreted also as a kind of an unfolding procedure, but SLDNFA is equiped with a mechanism for checking the consistency of each of the disjuncts at the right hands of the generated explanation formula. In our opinion, this is absolutely necessary because even for simple problems, an explanation formula can be so complex that it is impossible for humans to grasp its meaning and to check its consistency.
An interesting statement in 11] is related to the following example D 6 (a syntactical simpli cation of the example in theorem (8) Z 1 = fHolds(f;s 0 )g fNoninertial(f;a;a n ) j n 2 INg Z 2 = fHolds(f;a n ); :Holds(g;a n ) j n 2 INg In Z 1 , Holds(f; a n ) (n > 0) and Holds(g; a n ) (n 0) are unknown since neither the atom nor its negation appears in Z 1 . Z 2 corresponds to a two-valued model, obtained by having f initially true and g false, a situation which is preserved when applying a. Then Dung argues that "it is obvious that only the rst solution captures the intended semantics of D 6 , for if we don't know anything about g, it is impossible to say anything about the outcome of a". Remarkable now is that Z 2 corresponds to a model of Dung's Du D 6 .
Here we touch a fundamental issue in knowledge representation: how should incomplete knowledge be formalised in a logic? What Dung suggests in this statement, and what is probably the original intention of Gelfond and Lifschitz, is that a model of a theory should re ect what one knows about the world: a model should be the set of atoms which are known to be true. Then indeed, Z 2 is incorrect, since we cannot know for sure that g is not true initially and hence f is possibly terminated by applying a. This is not the classical logic view on incomplete knowledge. In the classical logic view, a model is a mathematical abstraction of a possible state of the world, not the set of ground atoms which are known by or provable from the theory. To have incomplete knowledge on g in the initial state, is re ected by the fact that there are models in which g is initially true and others in which g is initially false. In a model in which g is initially true, f is necessarily terminated after applying a. When g is initially false, as in Z 2 , f remains true. It turns out that the two transformations and Du behave correct under this view. Note that D 6 has two models, one with initial situation ffg and another with initial situation ff;gg. These models correspond to models of D 6 and, as Dung perhaps has not noticed, with models of Du D 6 . Only for GL D 6 , the second model is weakened to the answer set Z 1 .
Of the two views, the classical view is de nitely the richest one. Indeed, consider the following formulas: Surely one will agree that they are intuitively right. As a matter of fact, they are true in all models of D 6 and Du D 6 and hence, they are implied by these theories. SLDNfA can prove each of them in D 6 . On the other hand, they are not true in the answer set Z 1 , and hence GL D 6 does not imply them. The problem with the incompleteness of GL is not due to models like Z 2 but due to models like Z 1 .
Though Dung does not investigate this, his technique for representing uncertainty can be generalised to other applications in a rather straithforward way. The resulting formalism would be a generalisation of the abductive logic program formalism, in which it is possible to give de nitions at the level of atoms instead of predicates. Such a generalised abductive program might be seen as a tuple of a set of de ned atoms D = fp 1 (t 1 ); : : : ; p n (t n )g and a set of normal clauses such that if two atoms p(t); p(s) occur in D, then they do not unify and if p(s) :-L 1 ; : : : ; L n belongs to the program, then p(s) should be an instance of an atom p(t) 2 D. Such a clause can be viewed as a de ning clause for p(t).
The semantics of such a generalised open program could then be given by FEQ and for each de ned atom p i (t i ) a completed de nition p i (t i ) $ : : : constructed using its de ning clauses.
However, this generalisation does not produce extra expressivity, as the formalism can be easily and elegantly translated to the open logic program formalism. Given such a generalised logic program P, we can translate P to an open logic program P 0 obtained by adding for each predicate p=n one new unde ned predicate undefined p=n and taking the clauses of P and adding for each predicate p=n with de ned atoms p(t 1 ); : : :; p(t n ) one new clause: p(X) :-:(9Y 1 :X = t 1 ); : : :; :(9Y n :X = t n ); other ? p(X) Here Y i is the set of variables var(t i ) and X = t i denotes the conjunction of equality atoms X j = t i j . The completion of P 0 can easily be proven to be a conservative extension of P.
Though our approach was developed independently of Dung's approach, it clearly shows similarities it. Both generate a form of situation calculus using the logic program syntax, and the semantics of the resulting programs is given by rst order logic theories, constructed using di erent forms of completion of sets of clauses.
Despite the similarities, we believe that our work contributes in several important aspects.
Recall our two main goals of this experiment with A: rst, to show the role of open/abductive logic programs as a general purpose logic for representing uncertainty and second, to show the role of a suitable abductive procedure (as SLDNFA) for solving di erent computational problems, including deduction under uncertainty, abduction or the generation of explaining hypotheses and consistency proving. To both goals, Dung's paper does not really contribute. With respect to the rst goal, Dung proposes a novel formalism. He does not relate this formalism to open/abductive logic programming. As argued in section 3, we could prove the correctness of the transformation not only wrt completion semantics but wrt 3-valued completion semantics, generalised stable model semantics, generalised well-founded semantics, justi cation semantics, etc. This aspect is necessarily lacking in Dung's paper, since he doesn't consider abductive logic programming in the rst place.
With respect to the second goal, we have shown how SLDNFA can be used to solve three important types of computational problems: deduction (under incertainty) abduction consistency proving Dung does not consider these classical forms of reasoning but focusses on the use of an unfolding partial evaluation procedure for integrity checking of database updates. The question whether such an unfolding procedure is of practical use for general problem solving in temporal domains is not dealt with in Dung's paper.
Discussion
In 12], a First Order Logic solution to the frame-problem was proposed. 29] uses the same type of theory to formalise database evolution. This type of theory is a form of situation calculus which shows a strong similarity with the completion of a program D. Result=2 is replaced by do=2. Instead of using the meta predicate Holds=2, 29] adds one additional argument to each uent predicate; i.e. an atom Holds(p(x); t) is contracted to the atom p(x; t). As a consequence the law of inertia has to be stated for each uent. The rule says that when action A may be executed in situation S (Poss(A; S)), then student St is enrolled in course C at time do(A; S) i A is an action of registering St in C or, St was enrolled at S and A is not an action of dropping St from the course C.
As said above, this type of theory shows a strong similarity with the completion of the open programs produced by and with the completions of the logic programs found in 14] It is remarkable and frustrating that the above monotonic solution in classical logic has not been discovered much earlier. Some people have been experimenting with situation calculus in logic programming ever since the rst experiments in Kowalski's Logic for problem solving 21] ( rst edition in 76). That Prolog with negation as nite failure can be interpreted as a sound theorem prover wrt to the completion of a Prolog program is known since Clark's work 2] in 78. When 18] introduced the YTS problem to show the failure of several nonmonotonic solutions to the frame problem, it was soon realised by some in the logic programming community that the Prolog solution behaved perfectly correct. However, if Prolog can prove that waiting does not unload the gun and that the turkey is dead after loading, waiting and shooting, then from Clark's soundness theorem it follows immediately that the completion of the Prolog program entails these conclusions also, and hence that the completion of the Prolog program provides a (monotonic) solution to the frame problem. Generalising this example, it is a relatively simple step to nd that the principle of completion of implications gives an elegant and general solution to the frame problem. Yet, it seems that for many years, nobody, neither in the logic programming community nor in the A.I. community has come to this obvious conclusion or was interested in it.
In the past, another approach has been explored for temporal reasoning, based on event formalism for representing incertainty. It turns out that the technique used in 10] to represent indeterminate actions in the context of event calculus can easily be translated to situation calculus. The Russian Turkey Shooting problem is a variant of the Yale Turkey Shooting problem in which one additional action spinning of spinning the gun's chamber occurs. The e ect is that the gun is possibly unloaded. Below we allow e-propositions of the form a possibly causes f if p 1 ; : : :; p n . The problem is formalised as follows:
Initially alive Initially loaded load causes loaded shoot causes :alive if loaded shoot causes :loaded spinning possibly causes :loaded The semantics of A should be adapted. While in A, a successor state is completely determined by the action and the previous state, this is not the case with indeterminate actions. Therefore, in the extended version the transition function should be replaced by a transition relation. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to work out this semantics in detail, it is easy to show how the transformation could be adapted to model this kind of indeterminate actions. The indeterminism can be captured by introducing an unde ned Good luck=2 predicate:
Noninertial(loaded; spinning; S) :-Good luck(spinning; S) The above clause has the e ect that the rule of inertia is disabled for loaded i good luck occurs at the spinning action in state S. In general, for each clause a possibly causes f if p 1 ; : : : ; p n the following rule must be introduced:
Noninertial(jfj; a; S) :-Holds(p 1 ; S); : : :; Holds(p n ; S); Good luck(a; S) For a positive f, in addition the following rule is added:
Holds(f; Result(a; S)) :-Holds(p 1 ; S); : : :; Holds(p m ; S); Good luck(a; S)
Summary
We presented a sound and complete transformation from A domains to open logic programs with FOL axioms. We have illustrated the use of SLDNFA for abductive and deductive reasoning and satis ability proving under uncertainty. The transformation of Gelfond and Lifschitz is more complex, is not complete, is only sound for domains without e-similar actions and cannot be extended to the predicate case (at least not without imposing other syntactic constraints). Moreover, no reasoning procedure is currently described for the resulting programs. Dung's approach is in some aspects similar to ours and provides a reasoning procedure, but is still more complex than ours, has the disadvantage of relying on a special purpose logic and does not show the application of the reasoning procedure for classical forms of reasoning such as deduction, abduction and consistency proving.
We have investigated also a number of typical temporal reasoning issues. Although in D only forward persistence axioms are contained, the completion of D subsumes backward persistence axioms. We have also shown how to extend A with indeterminate actions.
From a more general perspective, this work can be viewed as a -successful-experiment in the declarative representation of and diverse forms of automated reasoning on incomplete knowledge using open logic programming and an abductive procedure.
